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Reining in a Culture of Fraud: Adopting Incentive-Based
Regulations to Reform Corporate Governance in Japan
INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2015, Toshiba’s CEO Hisao Tanaka announced that he was
resigning from the corporation to take responsibility for his involvement in an
accounting scandal that caused Toshiba to overstate its profits by
approximately $1.2 billion USD. 1 The fraud resulted from of a top-down effort
by Toshiba’s employees to inflate the company’s net income. 2 Top executives
at Toshiba set almost impossible profit targets, and pressured employees to
meet those targets by any means, including the fraudulent inflation of profits. 3
A lack of internal controls, combined with a corporate culture that demands
strict obedience to management decisions, resulted in a fraudulent inflation
scheme spanning over a seven-year period. 4 The scandal was ultimately
uncovered when Japan’s securities watchdog, the Securities and Exchange
Surveillance Commission (“SESC”), launched a probe into Toshiba’s
accounting practices and discovered the misconduct. 5
Toshiba’s fraudulent accounting scandal was not an isolated incident
among Japanese corporations. A multitude of accounting fraud scandals
regarding overstating profits have occurred in Japan: the Olympus Corporation
for $1.7 billion USD in 2011, IHI Corp. for $4.6 billion USD in 2007, Nikko
Cordial Corp. for $13.7 billion USD in 2006, and Kanebo Ltd. by 210 billion
Yen in 2004. 6 Accounting scandals, like the above mentioned, have serious
economic implications on companies and investors. 7 It is not unusual for such
1

J. William Carpenter, Toshiba’s Accounting Scandal: How It Happened, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 13,
2015), http://investopedia.com/articles/investing/081315/toshibas-accounting-scandal-how-it-happened.asp.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 John Boyd, Key Questions in Toshiba Scandal Still Unanswered, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 15, 2015, 6:24
AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/key-questions-toshiba-scandal-unanswered151011075457531.html.
6 Dave McCombs, The 7 Biggest Corporate Scandals in Japan, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 20, 2015, 10:38
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20150721/toshiba-s-accounting-scandal-ranks-among-japan-slargest-cases.
7 Anita R. Morgan & Cori Burnsid, Olympus Corporation Financial Statement Fraud Case Study: The
Role That National Culture Plays on Detecting And Deterring Fraud, 10 J. BUS. CASE STUD. 175, 175–76
(2014).
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companies to be forced into bankruptcy, causing many investors to lose
significant financial worth. 8 Clearly, financial statement fraud has adverse
effects on shareholders and must be stopped. However, these instances of
corporate misconduct are symptomatic of Japan’s record for poor corporate
governance. 9 Accounting fraud is only one of many negative aspects stemming
from Japan’s poor corporate governance regulations, and the lack of corporate
oversight has negatively impacted Japan’s overall economy. 10
According to the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), there is a strong
link between the quality of a country’s corporate governance regulations and
the overall health of its economy. 11 The IMF attributes Japan’s weak economy
to its lack of corporate governance. 12 Specifically, in this case, these poor
corporate governance practices link directly to the abnormally high cash
holdings by Japanese companies. 13 In 2015, The Economist reported that
Japanese companies were holding $1.9 trillion USD in cash, an amount
equivalent to almost fifty percent of the entire Japanese economy. 14 This
alarmingly high figure suggests that the lack of corporate governance practices
is a large factor contributing to a stagnation of funds amounting to nearly a half
of the Japanese economy. Thus, improvements in Japan’s corporate
governance regulations may not only reduce corporate malfeasance but could
potentially spur economic growth.
I. JAPANESE CULTURE AND BUSINESS
In order to understand why the above corporate governance reform efforts
are necessary, it is important to understand how the current top-down culture
facilitates Japanese corporate misconduct. Although Japanese public
corporations, for the most part, mirror public corporations in the United States
(i.e. they have shareholders, a board, and corporate executives), Japanese
companies tend to be much more responsive to the demands of their corporate

8

Id.
Id. at 175.
10 See Chie Aoyagi & Giovanni Ganelli, Unstash the Cash! Corporate Governance Reform in Japan,
IMF, WP/14/140 (2014), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14140.pdf.
11 Id. at 3.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Business in Japan: Meet Shinzo Abe, Shareholder Activist, ECONOMIST (Jun. 6, 2015), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21653610/print.
9
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executives than their shareholders. 15 This skewed interest in favor of corporate
executives is influenced by the Japanese tradition of ‘makoto’. 16 Makoto
means to “properly discharge all of one’s obligations so that everything will
flow smoothly and harmony will be maintained” above everything else, even
truthfulness and honesty. 17 It is based on the belief that social harmony is best
achieved through conformity and obedience to authority. 18 In a workplace
setting, makoto can create a leadership command chain similar to a military
hierarchy: the top executives give the orders and all lower level employees are
expected to obediently follow them. 19 Understanding such values reveals how
corporate accounting frauds can go unchecked over the course of several
decades. 20
In the Japanese business community, subordinate employees are expected
to demonstrate a deep level of commitment and loyalty to their corporate
managers. 21 Under the principles of makoto, it is disrespectful for an employee
to speak or act outside the scope of his or her prescribed position. 22 This belief
system prevents many individuals from challenging the decisions of their
superiors, and discourages them from disclosing any problems that may
arise. 23 In return, superiors will often reward their most loyal employees with
respect, appreciation, and even promotions. 24 Thus corporate managers are
able to consolidate their power by surrounding themselves with employees
who are committed to following their orders.
In addition to the values of makoto, Japanese ideas of cultural harmony also
play a big role in facilitating corporate misconduct. At its core, cultural
harmony can be best described by the Japanese proverb, “the nail that sticks
out gets hammed down,”—meaning that its better to follow the group than to
stand out25 Thus, “groupthink” dominates Japanese corporate culture. 26
15

Bruce E. Aronson, The Olympus Scandal and Corporate Governance Reform: Can Japan Find a
Middle Ground Between the Board Monitoring Model and Management Mode? 35 J. JAPAN. L 85, 100 (2013)
available at https://sydney.edu.au/law/anjel/documents/2013/ZJapanR35_05-Aronson.pdf.
16 Morgan & Burnsid, supra note 7, at 177.
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See generally id.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 Julian Ryall, Scandals Soil Japan’s Corporate Giants, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, (Nov. 22, 2015,
12:00 PM), http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1880062/scandals-soil-japans-corporate-giants.
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Oftentimes, employees will use groupthink to rationalize the validity of
impermissible acts by concluding that other employees exhibit the same
behavior. 27 Under such cultural norms, widespread corporate fraud is easily
achievable and oftentimes goes unnoticed.
The traditional Japanese values of duty, authority, and harmony are so
highly valued that individuals are taught to avoid disrupting social
tranquility. 28 Thus, it is easy to turn a blind eye to corporate governance
conflicts in order to avoid upsetting or destabilizing the social environment. 29
These cultural concepts and beliefs provide insight as to how the Olympus
accounting fraud, Japan’s largest known accounting scandal, persisted for
almost two decades. 30
II. THE OLYMPUS ACCOUNTING SCANDAL
To date, Olympus is Japan’s third largest accounting scandal. 31 Over the
course of twenty years, 32 Olympus was able to hide approximately $1.7 billion
USD in losses from investors. 33 The scandal stemmed from the management’s
policy of demanding that overly aggressive profit targets were met. 34 Unable to
meet these excessively high targets, employees set up complex schemes to
accelerate profits and bury losses, even using outside consultations for the sole
purpose of financial statement fraud. 35 The fraud persisted for 20 years, and
not one whistleblower came forward. 36 Viewed under the cultural principles
described above, it is understandable why such practices continued for a longtime. 37
In the case of Olympus, former CEO Tsuyoshi Kikukawa held all the
power to control the company. 38 Contrary to public companies in the United
States, board members and executives in Japan do not have clearly distinct
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Morgan & Burnsid, supra note 7, at 177.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Aronson, supra note 15, at 88.
McCombs, supra note 6.
Aronson, supra note 15, at 88.
McCombs, supra note 6.
Aronson, supra note 15, at 88.
Id. at 89–91.
See id. at 88.
See infra Part II.
See Morgan & Burnsid, supra note 7, at 177.
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spheres of power. 39 This lack of power separation essentially allowed
Kikukawa to act as both the President and Board Chairman of Olympus,
providing him with unlimited authority to make all personnel decisions, even
at the Board level. 40 Kikukawa promoted only the most loyal employees to the
Board, essentially rendering the Board ineffective. 41 The Board became
beholden to the CEO to such an extent, that an investigative report revealed the
Directors were merely “emasculated” company “yes-men.” 42 All demands for
greater profits, regardless of feasibility, were met using any means necessary,
including the inflation of financial figures in a display of loyalty. 43
When Kikukawa demanded greater profits, his inferiors were all too willing
to meet those targets by any means necessary. 44 In a display of both loyalty
and social harmony, employees made a concerted effort to inflate financial
figures. 45 Employees’ overriding instinct was to hide any and all mistakes
regardless of the costs. 46 Company loyalty was so great that no one ever
bothered to blow the whistle or criticize the actions. 47 Olympus fell victim to
groupthink.
After two decades of deceit, the Olympus scandal was discovered when
Michael Wood, Olympus’ first non-Japanese CEO, become a whistleblower. 48
Wood became suspicious after witnessing an employee attempt to hide a
newspaper article that alleged Olympus had engaged in corporate
misconduct. 49 Wood launched an internal investigation, and upon discovering
the fraudulent acts by former CEO and current Chairman of the Board,
Kikukawa, Wood demanded letters of resignation for all board members. 50 The
following day, Kikukawa promptly retaliated by firing Wood. 51 The Olympus
case demonstrates two major problems that Japanese corporate governance
regulations must address: (1) the consolidation of power into a single
individual, and (2) the feverous loyalty of subordinate employees.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

See id. at 178.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 177.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 178–79.
Id.
Id.
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In fixing these two major issues in Japanese corporate governance, reform
must: (1) separate power between board and executives; (2) incentivize
executives to maximize profitability for their company; (3) adequately
compensate and protect whistleblowers in order to encourage people to report
misconduct. The passage of Japan’s very first comprehensive corporate
governance code is the first sign that Japan may be moving towards this
direction. However, more needs to be done to make the code a cornerstone of
Japanese corporate governance.
III. THE NEW CODES: AN ATTEMPT AT REFORM
In previous years, any attempt at reforming Japanese corporate governance
was met with strong opposition by powerful business executives lobbying to
maintain the status quo. 52 Despite significant pushback, Japan was recently
able to implement two landmark corporate governance reforms: the
Stewardship Code (“SC”) on February 26, 2014, and the Corporate
Governance Code (“CGC”),on March 5, 2015. 53 Described as ‘two wheels of a
cart’, these codes are considered essential to achieving effective Japanese
corporate governance regulations. 54 The SC targets institutional investors,
while the CGC targets Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (“TSE”). 55
The SC is a set of principals meant to encourage institutional investors to
be more responsive to their clients and beneficiaries. 56 While the SC is
voluntary, over 184 large institutional investors have pledged to abide by its
principles on a “comply or explain basis.” 57 This allows institutional investors
to either comply with the broad principles of the SC, or explain why
compliance was not possible. 58 This method allows for quick adoption and
implementation across a wide variety of industries and markets, rather than a
black-letter law approach prescribing specific actions or conduct that may be
unsuitable or impossible achieve. 59 The SC requires that any instances of non52 Japan: Landmark Corporate Governance Reforms, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER 1 (May
2015), http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/Japan%20-%20landmark%20
corporate%20governance%20reforms%20(May%202015).pdf.
53 Id. at 1.
54 Id. at 2.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 3.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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compliance be included in periodic reports that institutional investors release to
demonstrate whether stewardship responsibilities are fulfilled. 60
In addition to the “comply or explain” method, the SC requires institutional
investors to act in the best interests of clients and beneficiaries. 61 To achieve
this, the SC requires that an open and honest dialogue be maintained between
investors and clients. 62 The SC also emphasizes the importance of achieving
medium-to-long-term returns on investments. 63 Critical to long-term success,
is an investor actively managing and monitoring investments consistent with
shareholder goals. 64 In order to comply with the SC, institutional investors
must pressure investee companies to meet medium-to-long-term growth goals
consistent with the shareholders’ objectives. 65 The SC increases the
responsiveness of corporations who have historically ignored shareholders.
The CGC consists of mandatory principles all companies listed on the TSE
and JASDAQ must comply with. 66 The CGC drew inspiration from the United
Kingdom’s corporate governance laws, and contains a set of principles and
objectives publicly traded companies must observe using a “comply or
explain” basis similar to the SC. 67 Unlike the SC, the CGC does allow for noncomplying high-growth and emerging companies to be held to a lower
reporting standard and does not contain a provision clearly delineating the
roles of Board members and corporate executives. 68 Some hallmarks of the
CGC include requirements that all companies employ at least two outside
board of directors, engage actively with shareholders, and relax corporate
measures meant to dissuade mergers and acquisitions. 69 In addition, the CGC
requires that Directors owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders in order to
promote medium-to-long-term growth for the benefit of the company as a
whole. 70

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
See id.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
See id.
Id. at 3.
See id.
Id. at 4–5.
See id.
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The CGC has been in existence for less than a year, and critics are already
questioning its effectiveness on improving Japan’s corporate governance. 71
Least convincing of the CGC’s success was Toshiba’s ability to commit
accounting fraud while being compliant with the CGC’s requirement of
appointing at least two outside directors. 72 The appointment of outside
directors was largely heralded as a solution for the problematic lack of
transparency existing among Japanese corporations. 73 However, it is still too
premature to imply that the CGC has failed to improve all aspects of corporate
governance in Japan.
The CGC and SC address corporate governance reform by incentivizing
positive compliance with corporate governance practices and punishing
corporate malfeasance. However, critics argue the CGC and SC need
additional strengthening to successfully address specific concerns that general
punishment cannot effectively regulate. 74 Moreover, critics fear that companies
will superficially follow the CGC and SC without implementing the actual
reforms. 75 For both codes to be effective, a “genuine change in outlook” must
occur. 76 Only if Japan is willing to back the legitimacy of the SC and CGC
with the proper enforcement mechanisms and economic incentives will change
be possible. The SESC’s recent move to aggressively police corporate
misconduct is a positive demonstration of Japan’s commitment to back the
legitimacy of its new reforms. 77
IV. ENFORCEMENT AND POLICING BEHAVIOR
The Financial Services Agency (“FSA”) is the government regulator
currently tasked with implementation of the SC and CGC. 78 In order to better
understand the effect the codes have on corporate governance, the FSA created
the Japan Revitalization Strategy (“JRS”). 79 The JRS requires regulators and
71 See Masao Nakamura, Has Japan’s Corporate Governance Reform Worked?, EAST ASIA FORUM (Oct.
23, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/23/hasjapanscorporategovernancereformworked.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Japan Needs to Make New Governance Rules Work, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016, 7:03 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8bb28aae-c374-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e.html#axzz40Fbq4QWM.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See supra Part I.
78 See The First Council of Experts Concerning Follow-up of Japan’s Stewardship Code and Japan’s
Corporate Governance Code, FIN. SERVICES AGENCY 1, 1–2 (Sept. 21, 2015), available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/follow-up/minutes/20150924-1.pdf.
79 Id.
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industry leaders to periodically meet and strategize about how best to
implement reform. 80 Based on the JRS and recent enforcement actions by FSA,
there are early signs that policing corporate behavior is a high priority for
regulators. 81 While promising, critics are skeptical about whether these current
actions will be enough to shift corporate behavior.
Minutes from recent JRS meetings indicate the FSA’s top priority is to
ensure listed companies appoint at least two outside directors. 82 FSA believes
this is key to stemming the tide of Japan’s corporate accounting scandals,
however, recent events with Toshiba cast doubt on the effectiveness of this
regulation. 83 Despite the fact that Toshiba had four outside board of directors,
it was still able to pull off one of the largest accounting frauds in Japanese
history. 84 The FSA’s intense focus on improving board diversity begs the
question of whether the agency is superficially implementing rules rather than
focusing on dismantling the cultural norms of makoto and groupthink prevalent
in Japanese culture.
Recently, historic fines were levied on companies engaged in misconduct
by Kiyotaka Sasaki, the head of the SESC. 85 Sasaki determined that Japan’s
past enforcement practices were largely ineffective at reining-in the rampant
corporate misconduct plaguing Japanese companies. 86 In the past, it was
believed that publicly shaming individuals who were caught for corporate
misconduct would deter such future behavior, but Sasaki cited the Toshiba and
Olympus scandals as evidence against this practice. 87 Instead of public
shaming, Sasaki has decided to employ an approach used by the United States
and European Union—levying high fines on the companies themselves. 88

80

Id.
See infra note 103.
82 See The First Council of Experts Concerning Follow-up of Japan’s Stewardship Code and Japan’s
Corporate Governance Code, supra note 78.
83 Id.
84 See Greg Muraski, Toshiba’s Accounting Scandal: Catching The Fuzzy Math, SMITH BRAIN TRUST
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/news/toshibasaccountingscandalcatchingfuzzymath.
85 See Tom Redmond & Takkak Taniguchi, Japan Watchdog’s New Top Man Sees Need for Tougher
Punishments, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 29, 2015, 7:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201509-29/japns-watchdog-s-new-top-man-sees-need-for-tougher-punisments.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
81
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Sasaki recommended that Toshiba be fined approximately $59.9 million
USD (7.37 billion Yen) for its accounting fraud. 89 In comparison, the second
largest fine was held against IHI Corp. for 1.6 billion Yen in 2008. 90 Fines,
such as the one levied on Toshiba, hold companies accountable for corporate
misconduct, but do not directly impact those orchestrating the fraudulent
accounting schemes. Instead, finding ways to hold directors and executive
liable may effectively incentivize adherence to proper corporate governance
practices.
V. FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS
While Japan has taken some crucial steps towards improving corporate
governance, additional reform must be done in order to effectively change
current corporate practices and legitimize regulators enforcement efforts of the
SC and CGC. In order to stop future accounting fraud, the current corporate
power structure must be abolished through powerful incentives.
As previously discussed, the concept of makoto and groupthink deter
whistleblowers. Thus, offering an incentive may help increase reporting of
misconduct and decrease abuses of power. Currently, Japan does not offer
much protection for whistleblowers and has done little to prevent employers
from retaliating. 91 The current law for whistleblower protection does not
penalize or punish companies for retaliation against employees, and any fine
levied is minimal. 92
With the potential negative backlash involved with becoming a
whistleblower, employees often choose not to report corporate misconduct in
exchange for advancing their careers. 93 Japan should consider methods
employed by the United States, such as rewarding corporate whistleblowers

89 See Taiga Uranaka, Japan Securities Watchdog Recommends Record $60 Million Fine for Toshiba,
(Dec.
7,
2015,
10:06
AM),
REUTERS
http://uk.reuters.com/article/ustoshibaaccountingfineidUKKBN0TQ0IY20151207.
90 Id.
91 See Akihisa Shiozaki & Peter Coney, The Olympus Effect? Recent Changes to Whistleblower Law
Regime, INT’L LAW OFF. (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/White-CollarCrime/Japan/Nagashima-Ohno-Tsunematsu/The-Olympus-effect-Recent-changes-to-whistleblower-lawregime.
92 Morgan, supra note 7, at 179.
93 See Anna Kitanaka & Isabel Reynolds, Toshiba Case Points to Whistleblower Law’s Shortcomings,
JAPAN TIMES (Jul. 24, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/24/national/crime-legal/toshiba-casepoints-whistleblower-laws-shortcomings/#.VsC1WPIrKVM.
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with up to 30% of penalties, damages, or fines recovered by the FSA. 94 With a
scheme like this in place, a Toshiba whistleblower may have been entitled to
reward around $18 million USD. A number which may be enough to
encourage employees to break makato principles and report corporate
malfeasance. Which in turn, would make large scale accounting fraud difficult
for corporate executives to achieve.
Another potential for reform involves equating executive compensation
with company financial performance and success. Japan could benefit from
equating the corporate executive’s paycheck with the success or failure of the
company he or she manages. In Japan, the average CEO receives 60% of his or
her income from salary. 95 While in the United States, the average CEO
receives only 10% of his or her income from salary. 96 Incentivizing corporate
management through a shift in income source benefits corporate transparency
and also allows Japanese CEOs to reduce the gap in pay between their United
States counterparts earning, on average, 90% more. 97 By changing how
Japanese upper management calculates income, it is possible to incentivize
managers into making responsible corporate decisions a priority. 98
An amendment to the CGC requiring companies to link executive
compensation with company-wide financial success through stock options
could make this suggestion a reality. Furthermore, executives should be
required to forgo a portion of their compensation, in the form of a fine set by
the FSA, in the event that corporate misconduct is found to exist. 99 Requiring
executives to internalize the successes and failures of their companies may
reduce the likelihood of fraud.
Finally, the FSA should work heavily with the TSE to develop a robust
framework of penalties for non-compliance with the corporate governance
94 See Qui Tam Explained: What is the False Claims Act? How Does a Qui Tam Case Work?, PHILLIPS
& COHEN LLP, http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/Qui-Tam-Whistleblowers/Qui-Tam-Explained.shtml.
95 See Japanese CEO Pay Roughly 10% That of US Counterparts, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Nov. 13, 2015,
4:16 AM), http://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/Japanese-CEO-pay-roughly-10-that-of-US-counterparts.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Japanese Executive Pay: Spartan Salarymen, ECONOMIST (Jun. 30, 2010, 5:05 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/06/japanese_executive_pay.
99 See June Rhee, Holding Corporate Officers and Directors Accountable for Failures of Corporate
Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (April 16, 2015),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/16/holdingcorporateofficersanddirectorsaccountableforfailuresofcorpo
rategovernance/ (suggesting that executive pay be reduced by 25% in the event a company is fined more than
$10 million and that pay be docked for a minimum of 3 years).
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code. Currently, it is unclear whether the “comply or explain” method will
result in penalties for the non-compliant company. It is important that the
“explain” procedures for non-compliance are not a substitute for adhering to
the CGC and SC. In order to be sure this loophole is not exploited, noncomplying companies should work with regulators to submit a proposal
outlining how they plan to become compliant. Companies under review should
also allow regulators to conduct periodic check-ins to ensure that compliance is
occurring, and if not, fines should be imposed for continued non-compliance or
serious infractions. This will also create an incentive for the public and other
industry members to police companies who have fallen out of compliance.
In conclusion, providing economic incentives and penalties may be an
effective solution towards addressing Japan’s poor corporate governance
practice. The three-pronged approach proposed in this Essay seeks to solve the
two major problems causing corporate malfeasance in Japan by building on the
developments Japan’s recent reform efforts—the SC and CGC.
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